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The recent development in the measurements of spontaneous mental state understanding, employing
eye-movements instead of verbal responses, has opened new opportunities for understanding the
developmental origin of “mind-reading” impairments frequently described in autism spectrum disorders
(ASDs). Our main aim was to characterize the relationship between mental state understanding and the
broader autism phenotype, early in childhood. An eye-tracker was used to capture anticipatory looking
as a measure of false beliefs attribution in 3-year-old children with a family history of autism (at-risk
participants, n  47) and controls (control participants, n  39). Unlike controls, the at-risk group,
independent of their clinical outcome (ASD, broader autism phenotype or typically developing), per-
formed at chance. Performance was not related to children’s verbal or general IQ, nor was it explained
by children “missing out” on crucial information, as shown by an analysis of visual scanning during the
task. We conclude that difficulties with using mental state understanding for action prediction may be an
endophenotype of autism spectrum disorders.
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It has been proposed that the social and communication impair-
ments that characterize autism spectrum disorders (ASDs) stem
from delays and/or difficulties with understanding that human
actions are a result of mental states (e.g., desires, knowledge and
beliefs), which may not always conform to reality (Baron-Cohen,
2005, but see Gernsbacher & Frymiare, 2005). Although “theory
of mind” studies often show participants with ASD at a disadvan-
tage, compared to control participants, exceptions do exist, which
make it difficult to describe mindreading difficulties as a core
deficit in ASD. For example, tasks that assess false belief under-
standing (e.g., the Sally-Anne task, the Smarties task) have repeat-
edly found that children with ASD fail at an age where typically
developing children had long overcome any difficulties (Baron-
Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Leslie & Thaiss, 1992) but also that
performance is dependent on linguistic abilities (Milligan, Asting-
don, & Dack, 2007). Older children with ASD and/or those with
more advanced language easily pass these tests (Bowler, 1992;
Happé, 1995; Steele, Joseph, & Tager-Flusberg, 2003). This and
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the fact that difficulties with false belief understanding can also
result from language difficulties, such as specific language impair-
ment (SLI; Farrar et al., 2009; van Buijsen, Hendriks, Ketelaars, &
Verhoeven, 2011), suggested that reasoning about mental states
may be difficult only for less linguistically able individuals and is
therefore neither specific nor universal for ASD.
However, a nonlinguistic false belief task, designed to test this
ability in pre-verbal children (Southgate, Senju, & Csibra, 2007)
has recently revealed difficulties with using mental states for
action prediction, even in verbally able adults with autism (Senju,
Southgate, White, & Frith, 2009). In this task an eye-tracker is
used to monitor gaze behavior while participants watch a video
clip depicting a false belief attribution scenario similar in structure
to the Sally-Anne task. Instead of asking participants to verbally
report where someone would look for an object displaced without
that person knowing, eye-tracking is used to measure whether the
participant looks in anticipation toward the location where the
person is expected to search. Reality biases in responses (i.e., not
being able to inhibit looking to the true location of the object
instead of the location where the person would search) were
prevented by having the object removed from the scene instead of
just changing its location. These modifications allowed children as
young as 2 years of age to succeed in this task and thus show
evidence for mental state understanding (Southgate et al., 2007). In
contrast to the good performance of typically developing toddlers,
adults with Asperger syndrome and older children with autism
perform at chance (Senju et al., 2009). Measures of anticipatory
looking reflect spontaneous, on-line computation of others’ mental
states, which may be distinct from and developing in parallel with
the ability to reason about behaviors in terms of mental states when
explicitly asked to do so. Predicting other people’s actions based
on their mental states is as important for functioning in a social
world as being able to reason and communicate about these mental
states. Taking part in joint activities is just one example in which
action prediction is believed to be instrumental (Sebanz &
Knoblich, 2009). Unlike performance in classical Sally-Ann tasks,
anticipatory looking is unrelated to language skills (Ruffman,
Garnham, & Rideout, 2001; Senju et al., 2010) and is possibly
present in typically developing infants as young as 7 months
(Kovács, Teglas, & Endress, 2010).
The reliance on language skills to succeed in the standard theory
of mind task has clouded our understanding of the relationship
between mindreading difficulties and symptomatology of autism
in terms of social and communication abilities. One strategy em-
ployed to investigate this relationship is to take advantage of the
wider range of social abilities manifested by relatives of individ-
uals with ASD. For example, Losh and Piven (2007) showed poor
sociability in relatives was reflected in poor performance on the
“Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test,” a test that requires inferring
emotional mental states from only the eyes region of faces (Baron-
Cohen & Hammer, 1997; Dorris, Espie, Knott, & Salt, 2004). In
contrast, nonaffected siblings of children with autism performed as
well as controls, in standard false belief tasks (Shaked, Gamliel, &
Yirmiya, 2006). In this study, however, good performance could
be explained by the good verbal and nonverbal skills siblings had,
which may have allowed them to infer mental states off-line, when
asked explicitly. However, we know that even those individuals
with ASD capable of reasoning about a false belief situation like
Sally-Anne may still have difficulties with using this information
in real time (Senju et al., 2009).
It is the above considerations that motivated the current study in
which action anticipation based on mental states understanding
was measured in 3-year-old siblings of children with ASD, using
the same paradigm as in Senju et al. (2009). Younger siblings
manifest a wide variety of clinical and subclinical ASD-like traits.
Recurrence rates in these populations vary, but in the largest study
to date (N  664 at-risk siblings) around 20% of at-risk partici-
pants developed ASD when assessed around 3 years of age (Ozo-
noff et al., 2011). Moreover, other siblings at high familial risk for
autism, despite not reaching the clinical threshold for ASD, can
subsequently manifest a wide range of social and communicative
difficulties—considered to be manifestations of the broader autism
phenotype (Rogers, 2009; Yirmiya & Charman, 2010). Showing
difficulties in this task not only in those children with ASD but
also in those on the broader autism phenotype will reinforce the
hypothesis of a common origin for the social skills and the “min-
dreading” difficulties characteristic of ASD (Baron-Cohen et al.,
1985).
Failure in mental state understanding tasks must be interpreted
cautiously as difficulties with aspects of the tasks other than
mental state understanding can result in poor performance. A lack
of a bias or motivation to attend to socially relevant information as
well as attention disengagement difficulties have both been pro-
posed as alternative explanations for the apparent “mind-
blindness” of people with autism. It has been suggested that people
with ASD are not motivated to infer other people’s mental states
and intentions (Andari et al., 2010; Dawson et al., 2004; Liebal,
Colombi, Rogers, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2008), which could
make them “miss out on” information needed to succeed in theory
of mind tasks. Equally, failure could result from difficulties with
disengaging from irrelevant aspects of the scene (Elsabbagh et al.,
2009; Landry & Bryson, 2004) in order to notice when the actor
attends or does not attend to the displacement of the object.
Toddlers who eventually received a diagnosis of autism were also
shown to explore objects in atypical ways, by placing them in their
peripheral vision (Ozonoff et al., 2008). Because we used an
eye-tracker to monitor gaze we were able to quantify differences in
looking behavior during the task and thus address the above
concerns. Senju et al. (2009) did not find a relationship between
performance and gaze distribution in older children with ASD.
Other studies on this population have found a dissociation between
looking at and processing the looked-at information. For example
although children at risk for ASD had no difficulties following
someone’s gaze, they did not succeed in learning the name of the
gazed-at object (Gliga, Elsabbagh, Hudry, Charman, & Johnson,
2012). We therefore expect no relationship between visual atten-
tion distribution and performance in the false belief task. As in the
above-mentioned word learning study we expect all children,
including poor performers, to attend to key events (e.g., to look at
the actress when she turns away and cannot see an object being
moved).
This study aims to characterize the relationship between mental
state understanding and clinical and subclinical ASD profiles, in
3-year-olds with a family history of this disorder. For the first time
with this population, we use eye-gaze as a measure of using mental
state understanding for action prediction, a measure not con-
founded by children’s poor verbal skills. The nature of the clinical
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outcomes within the at-risk group offers the unique opportunity to
test whether difficulties with mental state understanding are char-
acteristic of children with a diagnosis of ASD only or of children
with poor social and communicative abilities in general (the BAP).
Having access to detailed gaze behavior during the task, a further
aim of this study is to show that poor performance is not due to
poor or atypical visual attention.
Method
Participants
Participants took part in a longitudinal study of children at risk
for autism. Recruitment, ethical approval (London Research Ethics
Committee, ref no. 09/H0718/14) and informed consent, as well as
background data on participating families, were made available for
the current study through BASIS, a UK collaborative network
facilitating research with infants at risk for autism. Families enroll
when their babies are younger than 5 months of age, and they are
invited to attend multiple research visits until their children reach
3 years of age or beyond. Measures collected are anonymized and
shared among scientists to maximize collaborative value and to
minimize burden on the families. A clinical advisory team of
senior consultants works closely together with the research team/s
and, if necessary, with the families’ local health services, to ensure
that any concerns about the child, arising during the study are
adequately addressed. At the time of enrollment, none of the
infants had been diagnosed with any medical or developmental
condition. Of the initial 50 Control and 54 At-risk participants, 39
Control and 47 At-risk contributed data to this study. Two Control
and one At-risk did not take part in the 36-months visit. Nine other
Control were excluded because data were not collected due to
technical problems (four) or because of having accumulated less
than 20% looking data (five). Six At-risk participants were not
included because of home visits (two), having accumulated less
than 20% looking data (three) or being more than 1 year older than
the group average at this visit (one). Participants’ characteristics
(age, gender, IQ) are presented in Table 1.
At-risk infants had an older sibling (hereafter, proband) with a
community clinical diagnosis of ASD (in three cases, a half-
sibling), and in one case two probands with an ASD. Thirty-eight
probands were male, nine were female. Proband diagnosis was
confirmed by two expert clinicians (PB, TC) based on information
using the Development and Well Being Assessment (DAWBA;
Goodman, Ford, & Richards, 2000) and the parent-report Social
Communication Questionnaire (SCQ; Rutter, Bailey, & Lord,
2003). The DAWBA is a parent-completed Web-based assessment
that asks parents to rate symptoms of autism, relevant to making
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed.,
text rev.; DSM–IV–TR; American Psychiatric Association, 2000)
and ICD-10 (World Health Organization, 1993) diagnosis of au-
tism spectrum disorders. Descriptive information about the child is
also included. The experts review the forms using both the scores
and the narrative text to assign a diagnosis. The SCQ is a widely
used 40-item questionnaire that asks about current and past autism
symptoms. Most probands met criteria for ASD on both the
DAWBA and SCQ (n  42). While a small number scored below
threshold on the SCQ (n  4), no exclusions were made, due to
meeting threshold on the DAWBA and expert opinion. For one
proband, data were only available for the DAWBA. Parent-
reported family medical histories were examined for significant
medical conditions in the proband or extended family members,
with no exclusions made on this basis. Infants in the Control group
were recruited from a volunteer database. Inclusion criteria in-
cluded full-term birth, normal birth weight, and lack of any ASD
within first-degree family members (as confirmed through parent
interview regarding family medical history). All Control infants
had at least one older sibling (in three cases, only half-sibling/s).
Screening for possible ASD in these older siblings was undertaken
using the SCQ, with no child scoring above instrument cutoff for
ASD (15). Sixty-two percent of controls and 85% of at-risk
participants were only exposed to one language.
Stimuli
The stimulus was a video recording, which depicted five main
events: two familiarization trials, two true belief trials (TB) and
one final false belief (FB) trial (see Figure 1). We familiarized
children with two events in which an actress reached through two
doors for a toy strawberry placed on the left (first trial) or the right
of two boxes (second trial). An audiovisual cue (the windows were
illuminated and a chime sounded) was given and 2.5 s later the actor
reached through the window and grasped the strawberry. The actor
wore a visor so that her gaze direction could not betray the
direction of her reach through the windows. The purpose of the
familiarization trials was (a) to show the children that the actor’s
goal was to reach for the object and (b) to teach the children that
when the audiovisual cue was presented one of the windows was
about to open. At the beginning of the two TB trials, a puppet
monkey appeared and placed a banana in the left box (first TB
trial) or the right box (second TB trial). After leaving the scene and
2.5 s after the cue appeared the actress reached through the door
behind the box that contained the banana. The FB trial is depicted
in Figure 1. Crucially, in this trial, the actor turned away from the
scene and the puppet monkey returned to remove the banana from
the right side box, which induced a false belief in the actor. After
the cue was given in this trial the scene froze for another 5 s.
Because we could not counterbalance the locations of the banana
in the FB trial within each outcome group (the outcome was not
known at the time when the study was carried out), the same video
clip was used for all participants.
Procedure
An integrated Tobii (Stockholm, Sweden) T120 17” Eye
Tracker was used to collect data on direction of gaze. Data were
collected at 60 Hz. Tobii Studio was used to present the stimuli and
for data analysis. Children sat on their own on a chair, at approx-
imately 60 cm from the Tobii monitor. At this distance the diag-
onal of the screen subtended approximately 40°. A 5-point cali-
bration was run before stimulus presentations. Children were told
that they would see a movie about a cheeky monkey. An experi-
menter stood behind the child and encouraged her to look if she got
distracted.
Data Reduction and Analysis
The 2 min 45 s long video was segmented into scenes of various
lengths corresponding to the various important events. To measure
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anticipatory eye-movements in the second true belief trial we
defined a 2.5-s interval after the visual cue appeared, which
corresponded roughly to the time taken for the person to reach
through the doors in both the familiarization trials and the TB
trials. Because the actor never reached through the door in the false
belief trial, a 5-s interval (until the end of the movie) was used for
analysis. For clarity, details about the length of other intervals
analyzed are given together with the results of those particular
analyses, in the Results section. Three areas of interest (AOI) were
defined manually for all scenes analyzed (see Figure 1), two
covering the left and right doors and boxes and another one
corresponding to the face. Cumulative looking time within areas of
interest was calculated automatically using Tobii Studio software.
Only fixations longer than 100 ms were included in the analyses.
Data loss could occur during the video presentation at different
time points (either due to looking away or to the eye-tracker not
detecting the eyes despite the fact that the child was looking). We
decided to only exclude children if they accumulated less than
20% data overall and not if only certain intervals had valid data,
the consequence of which was that slightly different numbers of
participants were entered in the analysis of different events (e.g., in
the TB and the FB trial analysis).
Outcome Characterization of the At-Risk
and Control Groups
Standard measures of cognitive development (Mullen Scales for
Early Learning [MSEL]; Mullen, 1995) and adaptive development
(Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scale [VABS]; Sparrow, Cicchetti,
& Balla, 2005) were collected. The MSEL is a standardized direct
developmental assessment that yields a standardized score (M 
100, SD  15) of overall intellectual ability (Early Learning
Table 1
Participants’ Characteristics
Variable
Control
(n  39)
At-risk
(n  47)
At-risk typical
(n  18)
At-risk atypical
(n  12)
At-risk ASD
(n  17)
Age (months)
M (SD) 39.5 (3.3) 38.0 (1.7) 37.9 (1.5) 37.5 (1.7) 38.6 (2.0)
Range 36–52 33–42 34–40 33–40 35–42
Gender
Male 21 27 12 9 6
Female 18 20 6 3 11
General IQ (Mullen)a
M (SD) 114.7 (16.1) 104.2 (22.5) 113.2 (15.0) 103.4 (18.9) 94.7 (28.5)
Range 72–137 49–147 86–142 63–126 49–147
Verbal IQ (Mullen)b
M (SD) 57.5 (8.5) 51.2 (12.0) 55.9 (14.5) 49.8 (8.6) 47.2 (15.9)
Range 41–69 29–73 43–69 29–64 20–73
ADOS SCc
M (SD) 5.5 (4.5) 8.8 (5.3) 4.1 (2.0) 12.0 (4.0) 11.4 (5.0)
Range 0–21 0–19 0–7 5–18 1–19
ADI Social
M (SD) 5.0 (5.4) 1.9 (1.7) 3.4 (4.9) 9.7 (5.5)
Range 0–5 0–18 1–19
ADI Communication
M (SD) 4.5 (4.9) 2.2 (1.8) 3.5 (5.4) 8.2 (5.2)
Range 0–6 0–20 1–16
Ethnicity
Caucasian 33 41 17 9 14
Caucasian/Asian 2 2 1 1
Caucasian/Latino 1 1 1
Caucasian/Black 1 1 1
Asian 1
Black 1 1 1
Mixed 1 1 1
Incomed
40K 9 17 4 8 5
40–80K 14 23 8 3 12
80K 16 7 6 1 0
Educatione
M (SD) 3.0 (0.9) 2.7 (0.9) 2.8 (0.9) 3.0 (0.9) 2.4 (0.9)
Range 1–4 1–4 1–4 1–4 1–4
Note. ASD  autism spectrum disorder; Mullen  Mullen Scales for Early Learning (Mullen, 1995); ADOS  Autism Diagnostic Observation
Schedule—Generic (Lord et al., 2000); ADI Autism Diagnostic Interview—Revised (Lord et al., 1994). Superscripts on data indicate differences between
low and high risk ( p  .05;  p  .01) and between the at-risk ASD or atypical groups and at-risk TD ( p  .05;  p  .01; Bonferroni correction).
a Mullen ELC score, M  100, SD  15. b Verbal ability T-score, M  50, SD  10 (based on average of Expressive and Receptive Language
domains). c The Social and Communication algorithm score of the ADOS. d Overall household income. e Mother’s education level (1  formal
education to 16; 2  formal education to 18; 3  university degree or equivalent; 4  postgraduate). Missing data for Education level (seven data points)
were replaced by the average of the risk group.
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Composite, and subscale T-scores (M  50, SD  10) for recep-
tive language (RL) and expressive language (EL), as well as
nonverbal fine motor (FM) and visual reasoning (VR) abilities.
The VABS is a standardized parent-reported interview of everyday
adaptive functioning that measures social, communication, daily
living and motor skills. In addition (and for both groups) a semi-
structured play-based assessment, the Autism Diagnostic Obser-
vation Schedule—Generic (ADOS-G; Lord et al., 2000) was used
to assess autism-related social and communication behavioral
characteristics (44 children were administered Module 2 and the
other three children Module 1 of the ADOS-G). This was aug-
mented (At-risk group only) with the parent-report Autism Diag-
nostic Interview—Revised (ADI-R; Lord et al., 1994). In common
with other research groups studying familial at-risk siblings
(Zwaigenbaum et al., 2007) a “best estimate clinical consensus”
approach to diagnosis was taken following review by experienced
clinical researchers (TC, KH, SC, GP), taking account of all
information about the child (i.e., MSEL, VABS, informal obser-
vation) in addition to information from the ADI-R and ADOS-G.
Children were included in the At-risk ASD group if they met
ICD-10 (World Health Organization, 1993) criteria for ASD.
Given the young age of the children, and in line with the proposed
changes to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Dis-
orders (5th ed.; DSM-5; http://www.dsm5.org), no attempt was
made to assign specific subcategories of pervasive developmental
disorder/ASD diagnosis. Children from the At-risk group were
considered typically developing (At-risk Typical) if they (a) did
not meet ICD-10 criteria for an ASD, (b) did not score above the
ASD cutoff on the ADOS or ADI, (c) scored within 1.5 SD of the
population mean on the Mullen Early Learning Composite (ELC)
score (77.5) and Receptive Language (RL) and Expressive Lan-
guage (EL) subscale T scores (35). Children from the At-risk
group were considered to have atypical development if they did
not fall into either of the above groups. That is, they either scored
above the ADOS or ADI cutoff for ASD or scored 1.5SD on the
Mullen ELC or RL and EL but did not meet ICD-10 criteria for an
ASD. From the 47 At-risk participants taking part in this task, 17
met criteria for an ASD diagnosis, 18 were At-risk Typical, and 12
were in the At-risk Atypical group (nine scoring above ADOS
ASD cutoff, one scoring above ADOS ASD cutoff and 1 SD
Mullen ELC cutoff, one scoring above ADI ASD cutoff, and one
scoring 1.5 SD Mullen ELC cutoff).
Results
We analyzed separately the true belief (TB) and the false belief
(FB) trials. As in previous studies (Southgate et al., 2007), only the
second TB trial was analyzed. By not including the first TB trial,
we thus gave children more opportunities to understand the actor’s
goal—to reach for the objects—as well as the role of the audio-
visual cue. For each trial we assess performance by analyzing the
difference between the looking time (LT) to the correct and incor-
rect doors’ AOIs, scaled by the amount of looking to those AOIs:
(LTCorrect  LTIncorrect)/(LTCorrect  LTIncorrect). Values go from
1 (exclusive looking toward the Incorrect location) to 1 (exclu-
sive looking to the Correct location), with chance level at zero. In
the TB trial, the correct location was that which contained the
banana. In the FB trial, the correct location was that in which the
actor thought the banana was. We start the analysis by comparing
the Control and At-risk groups to chance levels and to each other
and then compare the three outcome groups within the At-risk
participants (At-risk ASD, At-risk Atypical, and At-risk TD) to
chance levels and to each other (using Bonferroni correction for
multiple comparisons). Where a significant difference between
Controls and At-risk is found, we also test whether all at-risk
groups are significantly different than Controls (using Dunnett
correction for multiple comparisons). We also test whether any
individual variables that showed groups differences, like total IQ,
verbal IQ, or age (see Table 1) explain group differences in TB or
Figure 1. Key events during the false belief trial. The last frame depicts
the three areas of interest used for data extraction.
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FB performance. Finally, we examine whether visual attention
distribution during the false belief trial may account for children’s
performance. Three AOIs were entered in this analysis, the door
AOIs and another AOI corresponding to the actor (Figure 1).
True Belief
Looking time differential scores were significantly above
chance (zero) for both Control and At-risk participants: Control
t(37)  3.01, p  .005; At-risk t(40)  2.99, p  .005. A
univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) with Group (At-risk vs.
Control) as between-subjects factor yielded a nonsignificant effect
of Group, F(1, 78)  0.13, p  .716, 2  .002. Verbal and
General IQ significantly predicted performance—Verbal IQ F(1,
76)  1.78, p  .03, 2  .06; General IQ F(1, 76)  1.78, p 
.02, 2  .06—however, entering these factors in the above
ANOVA did not change the significance level for the main Group
factor. When analyzing the behavior of the three at-risk groups
separately, they only performed marginally better than chance—
At-risk Typical t(15)  1.24, p  .23; At-risk Atypical t(10) 
2.01, p  .07; At-risk ASD t(13)  2.03, p  .06)—possibly also
because of the reduced power of this analysis. A univariate
ANOVA comparing the three at-risk subgroups (At-risk ASD,
At-risk Atypical and At-risk Typical) yielded no significant effect
of Group, F(2, 40)  .19, p  .82, 2  .01.
False Belief
At the point at which anticipatory looking is measured in the
False Belief trial the two boxes were empty, thus preventing a
reality bias. Correct anticipation is reflected in longer looking
toward the box that contained the banana just before the person
looked away. As seen in Figure 2, looking time differential scores
were higher for the Control group than for the High-risk groups.
Preliminary analyses confirmed that Total IQ, Verbal IQ, or Age
did not have a main effect on looking time distribution nor did they
interact with the factor Group. We therefore removed these factors
from further analyses. There was also no group difference in the
overall amount of time spent looking at the three target AOIs
(correct, incorrect, and face) after the light prompt, in the FB trial
(MControl  3.35, SDControl  1.4 s; MAt-risk  3.56, SDAt-risk 
1.15 s), t(82)  0.71, p  .47. Mean looking time difference
scores were significantly above chance only for the Control par-
ticipants: Control t(35) 5.13, p .001; At-risk t(42) 0.86, p
.39. A univariate ANOVA with Group (Control and At-risk) as
between-subjects variable resulted in a significant main effect of
Group, F(1, 78) 9.35, p .003, 2 .10. The significance level
of the Group factor did not change when the TB looking time
performance was entered as a covariate and TB performance did
not have a significant impact on FB performance (see Table 2).
When the three At-risk subgroups (At-risk ASD, At-risk Atypical,
and At-risk Typical) performance was analyzed separately, none of
the groups performed different than chance: At-risk Typical
t(16)  1.21, p  .23; At-risk Atypical t(9)  0.36, p  .72;
At-risk ASD t(15)  –0.36, p  .71. A univariate ANOVA
comparing the looking time difference scores for the three At-risk
subgroups yielded a nonsignificant effect of Group, F(2, 42) 
0.79, p  .46, 2  0.03. Post hoc t tests, were used to compare
each at-risk group to the Control participants. Only At-risk ASD
significantly differed from Control participants (p  .009), At-risk
Atypical and At-risk Typical were not significantly different from
Control (p  .11 and p  .33).
Relationship With Social and Communication
Abilities (ADOS)
The lack of a difference in performance between the three
at-risk groups suggests that difficulties with mental state under-
standing may be unrelated to ASD symptom severity. To confirm
that performance in this task is only related to the risk status and
not to children’s social and communication abilities as measured
by the ADOS, we split the Control and At-risk groups depending
on their ADOS scores into a Low ADOS (ADOS  8; 25 out of 35
Controls and 21 out of 42 At-risk participants) and High ADOS
group (ADOS  8). Looking time performance was entered in a
univariate ANOVA with Group (Control, At-risk) and ADOS
(Low, High ADOS). This analysis yielded a main effect of risk
Group, F(1, 76)  9.41, p  .003, 2  0.11. The ADOS scores
 	






	














	

















	



















	













 
 
 
  !

 
" !

	






Figure 2. Looking time differential scores in the false belief trial. The chance level is at zero. ASD  autism
spectrum disorder. Error bars represent standard error.
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did not significantly predict performance, F(1, 76)  .19, p  .66,
2  0.003, and there was no significant interaction between risk
Group and ADOS levels, F(1, 76)  1.52, p  .22, 2  0.02.
Differences in Attention to the
Placement/Displacement Events
What can explain the poorer performance of the At-risk partic-
ipants in the FB trial? We were interested in determining whether
children’s looking behavior during the task differed in any way
that would explain their performance. One possible source of error
could arise from not paying attention to the hiding and displace-
ment events during the FB interval, especially the last hiding event
before the actress looks away. Visual inspection of looking time
distribution along the FB trial suggests that all groups followed
closely this event (Figure 3a: “Banana placed in the right box”;
“Monkey steals banana from right box”) and that major differences
between groups only emerge at the very end, when FB is tested
(Figure 3a: “Person turns back”). We looked more specifically at
attention distribution during key events. Groups spent equal
amounts of time looking at the box during the 8 s that the monkey
took to place the banana (MControl  4.9, SDControl  2.0;
MAt-risk Typical  5.3, SDAt-risk Typical  1.6; MAt-risk Atypical  4.9,
SDAt-risk Atypical  1.7; MAt-risk ASD  5.3, SDAt-risk ASD),
F(3, 84)  0.51, p  .67, 2  .01. Groups also spent equal
amounts of time looking at the box from which the monkey
surreptitiously removed the banana (MControl  7.4, SDControl 
2.9; MAt-risk Typical  6.5, SDAt-risk Typical  3.0; MAt-risk Atypical 
7.9, SDAt-risk Atypical 2.3; MAt-risk ASD 6.7, SDAt-risk ASD 2.7),
F(3, 84)  0.91, p  .44, 2  .03. It is also important to have
noticed that, when the banana was removed from the box, the
person was looking away. Visual inspection of looking time spent
on the face during the FB trial does not highlight consistent group
differences (Figure 3b), and, indeed, when we compared the
amount of time spent looking at the person’s face while the
monkey removed the banana from the box no group difference
was found (MControl  3.8, SDControl  1.9; MAt-risk Typical 
3.1, SDAt-risk Typical  2.4; MAt-risk Atypical  4.0,
SDAt-risk Atypical  2.7; MAt-risk ASD  4.5, SDAt-risk ASD  2.6),
F(3, 84)  1, p  .41, 2  .03. None of these measures
correlate with the FB looking time difference score, for either
the whole group or the low and at-risk groups separately.
Closer exploration of the data revealed that at the point in the
video where the monkey had placed the banana in the right box
and left the screen and before the person turned away, children
looked up at the person (MControl  2.0, SDControl  1.1;
MAt-risk Typical  2.2, SDAt-risk Typical  1.0; MAt-risk Atypical  2.7,
SDAt-risk Atypical 1.3; MAt-risk ASD 2.1, SDAt-risk ASD 0,9), F(3,
80)  1.42, p  .24, 2  .05, and then looked toward the right
door and box. Encoding where the person last saw the object or her
goal at this point where a TB is still held may be crucial for
predicting their behavior later. We analyzed looking time distri-
bution to correct (here where the banana had been placed) and
incorrect locations at this time point. Both Low-risk and High-risk
participants looked longer at the Correct side—average and SD for
Correct versus Incorrect for Low-risk: 620 ms (105) versus 370 ms
(81) and High-risk: 552 ms (90) versus 369 ms (69). A 2  2
ANOVA with Side and Group confirmed that there was a main
effect of Side, F(1, 79)  5.01, p  .02, 2  .06, but no main
effect of Group, F(1, 79)  0.21, p  .64, and no interaction
between Side and Group, F(1, 79)  0.11, p  .74, which means
that both groups looked longer at the box containing the banana.
To investigate whether looking time distribution at this point was
related to performance later in the FB trial we calculated difference
scores in both cases (Looking time Correct  Looking time
Incorrect). These measures were correlated in the whole sample,
r(70) .27, p .01, as well as in the Low-risk group, r(31) .40,
p  .02, but not in the High-risk group, r(39)  .13, p  .41. A
Chow test demonstrated that the slope and intercept of the regres-
sion analysis predicting test performance from looking time dis-
tribution when the person last saw the object was not significantly
different for the high-risk and low-risk participants, F(1, 69) 
2.02, p  .15.
Discussion
Previous studies of mental state understanding have documented
difficulties with on-line computation of mental states in older
children with ASD (Senju et al., 2010) as well as in adults with
ASD (Senju et al., 2009). Here we provide evidence that this
impairment is measurable as early as 3 years of age in children at
familial risk for this disorder and that it is not restricted to those
children having received a diagnosis of ASD. Control participants,
as a group, performed above chance, confirming previous findings at 24
months of age (Southgate et al., 2007) and suggesting this ability is
continuously present during development from 2 years of age
through adulthood (Senju et al., 2009, 2010). The At-risk partici-
pants, included in the study on the basis of having an older sibling
with ASD, developed a wide range of social and communication
abilities by 3 years of age, with some children receiving a diag-
nosis of ASD and others manifesting other developmental prob-
lems, including subclinical scores on the ADOS-G, which mea-
sures ASD-like social and communication atypicalities.
Based on previous findings of subtle difficulties with inferring
mental states in relatives with poor sociability (Losh & Piven,
2007), we hypothesized that all children with poor social and
communication abilities, i.e., both At-risk ASD and At-risk Atyp-
ical groups, would show difficulties with mental state understand-
ing. Interestingly, all groups of at-risk children found the task
difficult, including those at risk who developed typically. More-
over, performance was not related to social and communication
Table 2
Looking Time Differential Scores in the True Belief and False
Belief Trials
Variable Control At-risk
At-risk
typical
At-risk
atypical
At-risk
ASD
True belief
M .30 .25 .19 .32 .28
SD .62 .55 .61 .52 .52
N 38 41 16 11 14
False belief
M .42 .07 .18 .04 .04
SD .49 .53 .64 .40 .46
N 36 43 17 10 16
Note. ASD  autism spectrum disorder. The asterisk indicates signifi-
cance of one-sample t tests (p  .05) against a chance level of zero.
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abilities, as measured by the ADOS. The performance of the
At-risk Typical group was not significantly different from that of
the other at-risk groups but was also not different from that of
Controls, suggesting that they may have intermediary abilities,
with more participants succeeding at the task than in the other
at-risk groups. Notwithstanding these findings, the At-risk Typical
group’s performance was not significantly different than chance.
Although similar in terms of IQ to Controls, the At-risk Typical
group is more similar to the other at-risk participants in terms of
both genetic and family background.
The picture of autism emerging from recent genetic studies is of
a multifactorial disorder, in which outcomes are a result not of a
small number of deterministic factors but of the combination of a
great number of risk and protective factors (Geschwind, 2011).
This model is supported by recent findings from prospective
studies of infants at risk (Elsabbagh & Johnson, 2010). Difficulties
with mental state understanding could be one of these many risk
factors, which impacts on symptom severity only in combination
with other concurrent factors. Family environment is expected to
mediate shared genetic influences on the outcome phenotype both
in terms of mental state understanding and social and communi-
cation abilities. Previous studies have shown that having an older
sibling positively impacts on the development of mental state
understanding in typically developing children (Ruffman, Perner,
Naito, Parkin, & Clements, 1998). Many of our at-risk participants
did not have a typically developing older sibling (they only had an
older sibling with ASD). This may place them at a disadvantage in
mindreading abilities with respect to Control participants, all of
whom had a typically developing older sibling. At this point our
sample is too small to properly investigate the interaction between
genetic and environmental factors, something future studies will
have to clarify.
Although we take failure in our task to mean difficulties with
computing and using mental states, alternative explanations are
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Figure 3. a. Proportion of children looking at the face area of interest (AOI) during the false belief (FB) trial.
b. Proportion of children looking at the correct AOI (the right box) during the FB trial to illustrate all groups
keeping track of where the banana was placed. At-risk autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and At-risk Atypical data
were pooled together for clarity (continuous gray line). At-risk Typical (dashed gray line) and Controls (black
line). The onset of important events is indicated on the time line.
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possible. The design of the task, in particular the existence of a
True Belief condition, allows us to rule out some of them. Above
chance performance in the True Belief trial is evidence that both
controls and at-risk participants understood the task and were
motivated and able to anticipate someone’s actions. Although they
did not look to the correct location, a majority of at-risk partici-
pants (43/47) did look toward one of the two possible locations in
response to the audiovisual cue, in the False Belief trial, which
again is not compatible with a lack of motivation. Using eye-
tracking we could also ask whether performance can be explained
by any differences in the looking distribution during the task. It has
previously been proposed that attention disengagement difficulties
or a lack of a bias to attend to social information can result in
missing crucial information necessary to succeed in theory of mind
tasks (Dawson et al., 2004). This would be even more problematic
in on-line assessments of mental state understanding, than in
classical, slower paced tasks. We therefore analyzed looking be-
havior at various points during the false belief trial and showed
that all children looked at the object placement and displacement
actions and also looked at the person when she turned away from
the scene. There was thus no difference in the way children with
ASD attended to the sequence of actions. More important, the
amount of looking did not correlate with looking time performance
at test, confirming our initial hypothesis that poor performance was
not due to poor attention. Similarities in looking behavior in
response to various key events (e.g., looking at the person when
she turned away or at the monkey when she was engaged with the
banana) also speak against any oculomotor differences between
groups (Ozonoff et al., 2008). Of course, looking is necessary but
not sufficient for attending to and processing the information
fixated. As previously shown, in a word learning task, children at
risk for ASD could follow someone’s gaze to an object but did not
learn the word–object association as well as controls (Gliga et al.,
2012). Brain imaging studies of face processing have also shown
that even when asked to fixate faces, ASD participants activate a
less extensive network of brain areas than neurotypical participants
(Hadjikhani, Joseph, Snyder, & Tager-Flusberg, 2007). Thus, sim-
ilarities in scanning of visual scenes in autism may mask learning
and processing differences associated with this condition.
Some differences in looking behavior did appear during the
false belief trial. When visually inspecting the data we noticed that
children made saccades toward the location containing the banana
earlier during the FB trial, before the cue was given, at the point
where the person still held a true belief and could have reached for
the box. At this point groups were again indistinguishable, sug-
gesting that they had again correctly encoded the person’s reaching
goal. The positive correlation between looking toward the box
containing the banana at this point and looking toward this same
box later in the trial, when the banana had been removed, suggests
that, at least in controls, success in the FB trial depends on how
well one encodes the goal of the actress at the moment at which it
still corresponds to a true belief. This is compatible with one
current model that explains spontaneous mental state attribution on
the basis of corepresentations of people and the objects they
encounter and act upon (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Samson,
Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews, & Bodley Scott, 2010). Thus,
when someone repeatedly reaches for a particular object, their
goals or beliefs about that object’s location are stored in memory
together with that person’s identity for later reenactment. How-
ever, this correlation only holds in the control group. The lack of
a correlation in the at-risk participants could reflect encoding of
different information when children look at the box just before the
person turns away (e.g., the location of the banana instead of the
person’s goal) or difficulties with maintaining that information in
memory. Future behavioral studies could test the impact of mem-
ory by varying the time delay between hiding, displacement and
test. Brain imaging studies could measure the nature of the infor-
mation encoded initially (e.g., object location or action goal).
Although at this point we cannot tell whether these differences in
performance are due to at-risk participants not being able to
compute mental states nor whether they are due to not being able
to keep in memory someone’s representation of the world while
monitoring changes in the world itself, we subscribe to a recently
made case for the importance of theory of mind tasks to reveal not
just conceptual understanding but also functional usage of these
abilities (Apperly, 2012). Whether they can compute mental states,
we show that children with a family background of autism did not
use these abilities online to anticipate another’s actions, which is of
importance knowing that action prediction is believed to be crucial
for joint activities (e.g., for example Sebanz & Knoblich, 2009).
The current study advances our understanding of mental state
attribution in ASD by providing the earliest evidence that these
difficulties are not restricted to those children that fulfill diagnostic
criteria for ASD but characterize the whole at-risk group. It is
unclear at this point whether these difficulties are specific to ASD
risk, whether they reflect a genetic susceptibility, the influence of
the social environment or maybe the interaction between these two
factors. Difficulties with classical theory of mind tasks have been
documented in other developmental disorders like Down syn-
drome or mental retardation (Yirmiya, Solomonica-Levi, Shulman,
& Pilowsky, 1996). However, in these populations performance
was correlated with nonverbal IQ, which suggests general cogni-
tive factors like memory and attention can limit mental state
understanding. This was not the case in our study, where general
and verbal IQ did not explain group differences, nor did visual
attention distribution during the task. A detailed analysis of look-
ing behavior confirmed that failure was not due to “missing out”
on important information, such as where the object had been
placed/displaced or whether the person was attending to the scene
or not. Therefore, success on this task does not appear to be due to
where someone looks for information, but to how or whether the
“looked at” information is later used.
The mechanisms of mental state understanding have been sub-
ject to heated debates both within autism research and within
developmental psychology. We believe that both fields will benefit
from the study of younger siblings of children with autism. The
greater variability of social, communicative and attentional abili-
ties this group manifests will make it possible to identify necessary
conditions for the development and online use of mental state
understanding. For example, while succeeding in standard false
belief task depends on language skills, this is not the case for our
task. Being able to encode and maintain in memory action goals
while events unfold seems to be the limiting factor when mental
states are used for action anticipation. Moreover, the wider variety
of clinical outcomes in this population will help settle debates
about the specificity of mindreading difficulties to autism spec-
trum disorders.
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